



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## ON THE GREEK INFINITIVE AFTER VERBS OF FEARING

BY CHARLES BURTON GULICK

THE purpose of this paper is to examine a few notable instances of the use of the infinitive in Greek with verbs denoting fear, and if possible to define with some precision the limits within which this construction was allowed in the fifth century B.C. In endeavoring to restrict the construction, as I feel bound to do after studying the subject, to such well known uses as have abundant analogy in English, such as "I am afraid *to go*," φοβοῦμαι ἰλθεῖν, I am led to a different interpretation of certain passages from that now commonly accepted. Even if the explanations here offered be contested, I shall be content if I have been able to illustrate once more that "self-restraint" of the language which, after the tendency to use a certain construction had begun, prevented it from reaching extremes that would have resulted in looseness and ambiguity.<sup>1</sup> In sentences with μή and the subjunctive or the optative (*Moods and Tenses* § 365 ff.), which are too familiar to call for fresh illustration here,<sup>2</sup> the object of apprehension is conceived as impending, either immediately or in the immediate future. The subject of the dependent verb may or may not be the same as that of the leading verb. The question which concerns us now is whether the infinitive may express the object feared in the same way, and if so, under what circumstances.

The most striking example of such an infinitive is that quoted by Professor Goodwin (*M. T.* § 373), from Aesch. *Sept.* 707<sup>3</sup>:

---

<sup>1</sup> Cf. what Professor Gildersleeve says of the periphrastic tenses, *Syntax of Classical Greek*, Part 1, § 285.

<sup>2</sup> A chapter on φέβοι in Xen. *Cyrop.* 3, 1, 22 ff. shows the typical constructions.

<sup>3</sup> The numbering in the citations from Aeschylus is according to Wecklein's edition.

πέφρικα τὰν ὠλεσίοικον  
 θεόν, οὐ θεοῖς ὅμοιαν,  
 παναληθῆ, κακόμαντιν,  
 πατρός εὐκταίαν Ἑρινὺν  
 τελίσαι τὰς περιθύμους  
 κατάρας Οἰδιπόδα βλαψίφρονος.

The passage is commonly rendered: 'I shudder<sup>1</sup> at that goddess, destroyer of a House, not like other gods, prophet of evil all too true, the Fury invoked by a father's prayer — *I shudder at the idea of the Fury fulfilling the angry curses of Oedipus, whose wits were shattered.*'<sup>2</sup> This interpretation is based on the theory of an extension of the object infinitive from simple clauses like φοβούμαι ἀδικεῖν, in which the subject of the infinitive is the same as that of the controlling verb, to a wider usage allowing different subjects. This is certainly more correct than the older renderings, such as the Latin version in Schütz's edition (1809): *vereor ne iam [Furia] perfectura sit iratas amentis Oedipi diras*, according to which the infinitive is a mere arbitrary variant on the regular construction with μή and the subjunctive. Before I venture, with much diffidence, to suggest another explanation, it will be useful to examine other cases of apparently similar character.

In Thuc. 5, 105 (*M. T.* 372) we find οὐ φοβούμεθα ἐλασσώσεσθαι, 'we are not afraid that we shall be placed at a disadvantage,' where the future at once warns us that this is indirect discourse, pure and simple; φοβούμεθα, spoken in the confident and overbearing tone of the Athenians on this occasion, is only another expression for νομίζομεν or αἰόμεθα. The phrase is entirely like οὐδ' ἡμεῖς αἰόμεθα λελεῖψεσθαι, used in the same chapter for the same contingency. This equivalence is proved by the converse construction, in which an ordinary verb of thinking controls an infinitive with μή instead of οὐ; e.g. Thuc. 6, 102: νομίσαντες μὴ ἂν ἔτι ἀπὸ τῆς παρούσης σφίσι δυνάμεις ἱκανοὶ γενέσθαι κωλύσαι τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν τειχισμόν, 'thinking (i.e. fearing) that with the forces at their disposal they should no longer prove equal to preventing the building of the wall towards the sea.' It is as if the writer, conscious of the fear entertained by the Syracusans, began to

<sup>1</sup> The "emotional perfect," Gildersleeve, § 230.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *M. T.* 373, followed by Liddell and Scott, and Verrall in his edition.

use μή (or μή οὐ here) with the subjunctive or optative, but ended by interweaving the two constructions.<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Od.* 22, 39:

οὔτε θεοὺς δέισαντες οἱ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν,  
οὔτε τιν' ἀνθρώπων νέμεσιν κατόπισθεν ἔσεσθαι.

Admitting ἔσεσθαι to be the right reading,<sup>2</sup> it is plain that its dependence upon δέισαντες is very loose. The poet at first had an antithesis in mind, θεοὺς and ἀνθρώπους, the latter expressed by τιν' ἀνθρώπων νέμεσιν. The words κατόπισθεν ἔσεσθαι are an afterthought, appended to the notion of 'expect' which pervades the whole passage from vs. 35, where Odysseus says to the suitors: ὦ κύνες, οὐ μ' ἔτ' ἐφάσκειθ' ('ye did not expect') ὑπότροπον οἴκαδ' ἰκέσθαι.

Similarly, ὑποπτεύω takes the infinitive as well as μή with a finite verb, because the *thought* predominates over the *fear*. Xen. *Anab.* 2, 3, 13: ὁ Κλέαρχος ἔσπευδεν, ὑποπτεύων μὴ αἰεὶ οὕτω πλήρεις εἶναι τὰς τάφρους ὕδατος.<sup>3</sup> Cf. Thuc. 1, 132 (of Pausanias): ὑποφίας δὲ πολλὰς παρείχε μὴ ἴσος βούλεσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι.<sup>4</sup>

Cases, therefore, like Xen. *Cyr.* 8, 7, 15, φοβήσεται ἀδικεῖν, where we have the object infinitive precisely as in English, or like Thuc. 5, 105, οὐ φοβούμεθα ἐλασσώσεσθαι, where the infinitive is in indirect discourse, have no bearing on the passage in the *Septem*. The well known use of the infinitive with κίνδυνος may seem comparable; but here the apprehended danger is conceived as a *subject*, as in Xen.

<sup>1</sup> See Classen's note *ad loc.*

<sup>2</sup> Marcianus and other mss. have ἔθεσθε, which is not unintelligible.

<sup>3</sup> Hug, to be sure, reads ὑποπτεύων αὐτὸ τὸ πλήρεις εἶναι τὰς τάφρους ὕδατος, on grounds which have nothing to do with the present question.

<sup>4</sup> In both these cases the infinitive represents an indicative, not an optative or subjunctive. Perhaps, then, ὑπώπτεον γὰρ ἥδη ἐπὶ βασιλέα εἶναι in Xen. *Anab.* 1, 3, 1 may be rephrased: ὑπώπτεον μὴ ἐπὶ βασιλέα εἶναι, not ἔωσι or ἔωεν. In that case the future indicative (for εἶμι is a future) with μὴ (*M. T.* 367) might be explained, not as a variant on the construction with μή and the subjunctive, but as a future to the present indicative with μὴ (*M. T.* 369). Thus Ar. *Nub.* 493, δέδοικέ σ', ὦ πρεσβύτε, μὴ πληγῶν δέει means, 'I'm afraid you need a whipping,' and shows the present. Its corresponding future would be, μὴ πληγῶν δεήσει, 'I'm afraid you will have to have a whipping.' In ordinary language, however, μὴ δεήσει (fut. indic.) and μὴ δέη or δεήσῃ (subjv.) mean about the same, and the tendency in our mss. is to displace the future indicative by the more commonly used subjunctive, as in *Lys.* 12, 3.

*Anab.* 5, 1, 6, κίνδυνος πολλοὺς ἀπόλλυσθαι, which I should render, 'there is one danger: the loss of many of our men.' This is not strictly the expression of a fear; it is rather the calm statement of a risk to be expected. From this mild apprehension the transition to such familiar phrases as κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, 'you may possibly be right,' where there is no apprehension whatever, is both natural and easy.

The words and phrases<sup>1</sup> denoting fear, etc., occur with the infinitive whenever the fear, shame, doubt, or scruple leads to shrinking from the object and to precautions taken against it; or when the thought of indirect discourse is uppermost. In most cases, too, the subject of the infinitive is that of the main verb also. When, then, we find these conditions not met in *πέφρικα τὰν Ἑρινὺν τελείσαι*, we are justified in asking whether this sentence really belongs in the category just described. Following the prevailing usage, we ought to have *μὴ τελείσῃ*.

An examination of Aeschylus shows for all these words, when they occur, a perfectly normal and consistent usage. In fact, anomalous constructions in any category are not as common in Aeschylus as his well known obscurity might lead one to suppose. This obscurity is in almost all cases due to the pregnant use of single words or combinations of words; to compounds and the heaping of epithets which involve incongruous attributes and mixed metaphors. Syntactically, however, he is remarkably normal. Only a few notable syntactic peculiarities (and some of these are not exclusively his) can be cited. I note, for example, the omission of *ὥστε* in the case of an infinitive clearly consecutive in meaning, *Ag.* 485 ff.; the aorist infinitive *παθεῖν*<sup>2</sup> with *μέλλω*, *Prom.* 652; the aorist infinitive with *φησὶ*, an Homeric inheritance if the text is right, in *Sept.* 416; the potential optative without *ἄν*, *M. T.* 241, Gild. p. 182; the curious position of *οὐ* (*οὔτι*) *μὴ* in a dependent clause, *Ag.* 1640, *M. T.* 296 (c); *μὴ* and the future indicative with a verb of fearing, *Pers.* 118 ff.;<sup>3</sup> *ὅταν ἐκσφύζοιτο Pers.* 453-4. It was, then, his vocabulary, not his syntax, which caused him to be regarded as obscure. Herein he differs from Euripides and

<sup>1</sup> Chief among the verbs are *ἀθυμῶ*, *εἰς ἀθυμίαν καταστήναι*, etc., *αἰσχύνομαι*, *ἀπιστῶ*, *ἀπορῶ*, *δέδοικα*, *ἐλπίζω*, *ἐννοοῦμαι*, *εὐλαβοῦμαι*, *κίνδυνός ἐστι*, *ὀκνῶ*, *ὀρρωδῶ*, *σέβομαι*, *ταρβῶ*, *τρέμω*, *τρέω*, *ὑποπτεύω*, *φοβοῦμαι*, *φρίσσω*, *φροντίζω*, *φυλάττομαι*.

<sup>2</sup> See below on this word, p. 333.

<sup>3</sup> If indeed this can be called an anomaly. See p. 329, note 4.

Thucydides, whose sentences are formed with self-conscious delight in rhetorical artifice. Aeschylus, on the other hand, did not disdain the ordinary modes of constructing sentences, and is for example the first in literature to use the colloquial and intimate form of command given by *ὅπως* and the future indicative (*Prom.* 68). The criticisms on Aeschylus in Aristophanes are almost all directed against his diction, not his syntax. In *Ran.* 924 ff., it is said of him, *ρήματ' ἂν βόεα δώδεκα εἶπεν, ὀφρὺς ἔχοντα καὶ λόφους, δαίν' ἅττα μορμωπά, ἄγνωστα τοῖς θεωμένοις*; and again, 929: *γρυπαίτους χαλκηλάτους καὶ ῥήμαθ' ἱππόκηρυνα, ἃ ξυμβαλεῖν οὐ ῥάδι' ἦν*, all of which has reference to his novel, mouthfilling compounds. So *Nub.* 1367, *ψόφον πλέων δξύστατον στόμφακα κρημνοποιόν*.

This seems to me to lead to the presumption that had he intended to use *τελέσαι* as equivalent, even remotely, to *μὴ τελίσῃ*, we should find indication of this usage elsewhere. But, again, it is especially true of his use of words denoting fear that we find him employing the regular constructions. I cite a few instances: *Pers.* 811 *οὐ βρέτῃ ἡδούντο συλᾶν*, 'scrupled not to violate'; *Cho.* 898, *μητὴρ' αἰδεσθῶ κτανεῖν*; 'am I to refrain (through any scruple) from slaying?'; *Ag.* 847 *οὐκ αἰσχυνούμαι λῆξαι*, cf. *Cho.* 916; *Prom.* 655, *ὀκνῶ θραῆσαι φρένας*; *Sept.* 406, *τρέμω δ' αἵματηφόρους μόρους ὑπὲρ φίλων ὀλομένων ιδέσθαι*<sup>1</sup>; *Pers.* 696, *σέβομαι προσιδέσθαι*; *Cho.* 45, *φοβοῦμαι ἐκβαλεῖν*, cf. *Suppl.* 384; *τρέω* has the accusative (*Sept.* 384, *Ag.* 554, *Eum.* 429), or the participle (*Suppl.* 719), or *μὴ* with the subjunctive (*Sept.* 775); *φρίσσω*, except in the passage under discussion, has the participle<sup>2</sup> (*Prom.* 556, 721, *Suppl.* 348, *Sept.* 477).

In all these cases there is no change of subject. In regard to *φυλάττομαι*, we note another important fact, that when the precaution is due to fear, *μὴ* with the subjunctive must necessarily be used, as in *Prom.* 406. *Suppl.* 507. For Aeschylus, the infinitive with *φυλάττομαι* would have been impossible here, as is seen from *Suppl.* 211: *φυλάξο-*

<sup>1</sup> Whatever the meaning of this much debated passage, it is at least clear that *ιδέσθαι* is an ordinary object infinitive. So, too, in another troubled passage, where *φρονῶ* is used in the sense of 'take precautions': *Suppl.* 781, *φρόνει μὲν, ὡς ταρβοῦσα, μὴ ἀμελεῖν θεῶν*.

<sup>2</sup> The infinitive is used in *Dem.* 21, 135, *ὁ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐφριξε ποιῆσαι*, i. e. 'have shrunk from doing.'

μαι δὲ τάσδε μνησθῆναι σέθεν κεδνὰς ἰφετμὰς, 'I shall be careful to remember,' not, of course, 'I shall beware of remembering.'

Apparently, then, the only way to express 'I shudder lest she may fulfil' is by *πίφρικα μὴ τελίση*, as is shown twice in this same ode: *Scrl.* 749, *δίδουκα δὲ σὺν βασιλεῦσι μὴ πόλις δαμασθῇ*; and 775, *νῦν δὲ τρέω μὴ τελίση καμψίπους Ἑρινύς*. With this last sentence the poet reverts to the thought contained in the opening strophe, though expressed from a different point of view, as we shall presently see. The whole is thus made compact, the poet strikes hard with his main idea, and the emphasis is all the greater if he expresses himself each time in a different way.

Having established a presumption against the traditional interpretation, let us look at the positive evidence which may seem to support it. This may, at first sight, thought to be contained in three interesting passages in Euripides. *Med.* 1251: *ὦ Γᾶ τε καὶ παμφαῆς Ἀκτὺς Ἑλίου, κατῖδετε ἴδετε τὰν οὐλομένην γυναῖκα πρὶν φοινίαν τέκνοις προσβαλεῖν χεῖρ' αὐτοκτόνον· σᾶς γὰρ <σπέρμα> χρυσίας γονᾶς ἔβλασταν, θεοῦ δ' αἶμα <πίτνειν> φόβος ὑπ' ἀνέρων*. This passage is corrupt, but the main thought in it is clear. Many take *φόβος πίτνειν* to mean, 'there is fear that blood may be spilt.' This interpretation gives the effect of anticlimax after the excited invocation to Ge and Helios, and the words *κατῖδετε . . . αὐτοκτόνον* are enough to show that the crime is already too imminent for apprehension of the future; in fact, it is all but committed. Plainly, then, Wecklein and others are right in taking *φόβος* as equal to *φοβερόν*: 'for it is a frightful thing for divine blood to be spilt by the hands of men.' This interpretation makes the clause beginning with *θεοῦ δ'* follow as a necessary explanation of *ἔβλασταν*, and brings out *θεοῦ* and *ἀνέρων*, standing at opposite points in the sentence, in more distinctly antithetic relief.

*Ion.* 1564: *θανεῖν σε δέϊσας μητρὺς ἐκ βουλευμάτων καὶ τήνδε πρὸς σοῦ*. Here at last we seem to have a genuine case. The aorist *θανεῖν* instead of *θανεῖσθαι* excludes the hypothesis of indirect discourse. The phrase is clearly used in the sense of *δέϊσας μὴ θάνῃς*. So in *Hec.* 768: *πατὴρ νιν ἐξέπεμψεν, ὀρρωδῶν θανεῖν*. The explanation, however, of this divergence from the normal construction is simple. In the *Ion* passage the use of the infinitive instead of the subjunctive has a rhetorical justification, since it contrasts *σέ* and *τήνδε*, mother and son,

more neatly than a finite mood, with its change of persons, possibly could. In this and the *Hecuba* passage *θανεῖν* is virtually a substantive; 'the father feared death' (for his son). This is so common a use of constantly recurring forms like *θανεῖν* and *παθεῖν* that I need illustrate it with only one passage, Mimnermus 2, 10: *τεθνάμεναι βέλτιον ἢ βίσιος*. So *παθεῖν* is equal to *πάθος* in Eur. *Frag.* 128: *τὰς συμφορὰς γὰρ τῶν κακῶς πεπραγόντων οὐπώποθ' ὕβρις, αὐτὸς ὀρρωδῶν παθεῖν*. It is as if Perseus had said, 'because I fear Nemesis for myself.'<sup>1</sup>

In view of these passages, each of which has its own justification for the use of the infinitive, it appears to me unlikely that *τελέσαι* should have been used for the subjunctive by Aeschylus. Certainly, if the construction were recognized by later Greeks as normal, it would seem strange that it was not imitated by them. In Plut. *Pericles* 7 we have *φοβούμενος ἐξοστρακισθῆναι* made easy by the fact that the subject is unchanged. But even here the whole tone of the passage shows that this is not a vivid apprehension, but merely conditional on Pericles going into politics: 'if he entered on a public career he *expected* to be ostracised.' Hence he abstained.

In the passage from the *Septem* *τελέσαι* may be construed with *εὐκαταῖαν*, which has a participial force, as in *Sept.* 826, *πατρόθεν εὐκαταῖα φαίται*, and *Ag.* 1386 *εὐκαταῖαν χάριν*, 'the gratification I have vowed.'

The word *εὐκαταῖος* occurs five times in Aeschylus (*Sept.* 710, 825, *Ag.* 1386, *Frgt.* 55 Nauck, *Suppl.* 639). Like *ἀραῖος*,<sup>2</sup> it may have both an active and a passive meaning: active, of prayers containing a vow, as in the comic tautology of Aristoph. *Av.* 1060, *εὐκαταῖαι εὐχαῖς*; passive, of the divinity invoked, as *Ἐρινύς*, *Θέμις*, *θεός*, *Σελήνη*. The passive idea is more common in tragedy (Eur. *Med.* 169, *Or.* 214, *I. T.* 213, Soph. *Tr.* 239, Hesych. s. v. *Οὐρανὴ νύξ*).

Although no instances of the infinitive with *εὐκαταῖος* actually occur, this may be a mere chance, for the scholiast on the *Septem* finds no diffi-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lys. 24, 10, *περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐμῆς ἱππικῆς, ἧς οὗτος ἐτόλμησε μνησθῆναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, οὔτε τὴν τύχην δέσας οὔτε ὑμᾶς ἀσχυρθεῖς, οὐ πολλὰ δὲ λόγος*. Or, since the subject remains the same, we may explain *ὀρρωδῶν* as equivalent to *εὐλαβούμενος*, with Ammonius (Valck. p. 25, Eranius Phil. p. 158), who quotes the fragment: *ὀρρωδεῖν, ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐλαβεῖσθαι*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Pollux, 5, 130: *ἀραῖος* of the man who utters an imprecation, and of the person imprecated.



culty in construing τελίσαι as I propose. In his comment on Ἐρινύν he says: ἦν ἐπηύξατο Οἰδίπους τελίσαι τὰς ἀράς. His explanation has been left unnoticed by the editors except Paley, who appears not to approve, though he can find no parallel to justify the common explanation of τελίσαι. Following the scholiast, then, I render: 'that Erinys of a father, invoked to bring to fulfilment the angry curses of Oedipus.'

